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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Pla;intiff

vs.

Case No.

8937

JAMES L. HATCH and
DELLA L. HATCH,
Defendants

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
AMICUS CURIAE

I

THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES AND
THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS CASE.

The interest of the United States is not clearly
brought out in the record or appellant's brief in this case.
Even though the United States has conveyed all of its
title to the particular tract of land here involved it, as
well as other parties to be mentioned, has a very real and
important interest in the questions presented for decision
to this Court. The same legal question arises as to hun-
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dreds of instances since May 12, 1919, wherein the State's
title to school lands has been exchanged for other lands.
In federal court litigation, to be explained later herein,
the State has asserted that some 377,000 acres have been
exchanged with the United States since that date. The
State has advised the U.S. Bureau of Land Management
that more than 92,000 acres are in this disputed category. Many of these lands are located in southeastern
Utah where, it may be judicially known, very valuable
oil deposits have been discovered. The United States
incorporated many of those sections into the Navajo
Indian Reservation. That Tribe has executed many leases
of such former school sections to the Superior Oil Company and Honolulu Oil Corporation and others. The State
of Utah has executed competing leases on some 13,719
acres of land, many of them to Western States Refining
Company and perhaps others. The financial interests
of the United States, the Navajo Indians, the Superior
Oil Company, the Honolulu Oil Corporation and Western
States Refining Company, none of whom is a party to this
case, are obvious.
There is another large class of persons whose interests may be vitally affected by the decision of tlris case.
Selection of lands by the State in place of school sections
is made, for the n1ost part, only when a pri\ate party has
sought such lieu lands. Thus 1nost, if not all, of the
377,000 lieu acres have been patented to private interests.
In this litigation the State contends that it received both
the minerals in the school lands and the lieu lands as well
as the surface rights in the lieu lands. ..Alternatively, the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
State contends that the exchanges should be rescinded
revesting in it the title to the school sections and returning to the United States the lieu lands. The State's position thus jeopardizes the titles of those disputed lands to
the extent that they had been sold or leased to private
parties. The interests of the multitude of owners, mortgagees, etc., of lands, title to which traces back to such
grants from the State, will likewise be vitally affected
by this decision, but they are not here represented.
So, also, the titles of grantees and lessees from the
United States, like the title of appellees Hatch, are
jeopardized by this claim of the State. Although the
State seeks to restrict its claim to the mineral rights
(Br. 1), it is inevitable that title to the tract as a whole
is involved since it is clear that the State is not entitled
both to whatever minerals there may be in the Hatch
land as well as the complete fee title to the tract it got
.from the United States in place of the Hatch tract (infra
p. 15).
II.
THE SITUATION OF FOUR OTHER CASES FILED
IN THE STATE OR FEDERAL COURTS THIS YEAR
HAS AN IMPORTANT BEARING ON THIS ·CASE.

Consideration of the entire controversy of which the
instant case is an integral part requires an understanding
of three cases pending in the United States District Court
for the District of Utah as well as another case filed with
this Court but dismissed in April of this year. Chronologically the last-mentioned case was the first one filed.
It was an original proceeding in this Court seeking a
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writ of prohibition against the State Land Board. The
case was filed as No. 8801 on January 13, 1958, under the
title of Lee v. Henderson. Lee, as assignee of an oil and
gas lease issued by the United States Bureau of Land
Management, sought to prohibit the Land Board from
leasing the same tract of land to Western States Refining
Company. That Company was permitted to intervene
to assert that the mineral rights in this tract belonged to
the State.
On February 27, 1958, the United States filed in the
United States District Court for the District of Utah a
case, United States v. State of Utah, et al., Docket No. C21-58, to quiet its title to that tract of land subject to the
Lee lease. It also sought in the same case an injunction
against prosecution of Lee v. Henderson. The injunction
was granted after hearing of March 15, 1958. The court
held that the Lee case constituted an attempt to adjudicate title to the minerals without the United States being
a party to the action, that there were federal questions
involved, and also that, as the court put it, "there are
elements which strongly suggest" that the Lee case was
collusive and not between adverse parties. This latter
statement was based upon facts, developed at the hearing, showing that Lee was a stockholder of Western
States and a good friend of the Chairman of its Board of
Directors, Mr. Eliason. Mr. Eliason arranged a test case,
approached Mr. Lee to use his name on an assignment of
a lease for that purpose, Western States to pay all ex·
penses and to secure attorneys for Mr. Lee. Mr. Lee had
never seen his assignor. The section involved was located
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a considerable distance from any oil and gas development.
Mr. McCarthy, counsel for Western States, said that
Lee's attorney was to act independently and that an adversary proceeding was contemplated. He further stated
(p. 11, Transcript of Federal Court Hearing, March 15,
1958, copies of which have been filed with the Clerk of
this Court):
At the time this petition was filed, your
Honor, counsel for Western States Refining Company and the Attorney General of the State of
Utah and counsel for Lee all went to see Chief
Justice McDonough and explained to him exactly
the nature of this test case, just as I have attempted to explain it here to your Honor today.
Justice McDonough, in effect, said that he
could see nothing objectionable iri the procedure,
although the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
would have to be affirmed as Lee (sic) (affirmatively) demonstrated.
The case of Lee· v. Henderson was dismissed a few
days later and the injunction consequently dissolved.
Pending these proceedings the United States had, on February 18, 1958, filed the case of United States v. State
of Utah, et al., Docket No. C-16-58, to quiet title to a section 32 alleged to be part of the Navajo Indian Reservation. The Navajo Tribe had granted a lease to the Honolulu Oil Corporation, which was named a defendant, while
the State had purported to lease the same land to one
George N. Larsen who assigned to Western States. The
third federal case, United States v. State of Utah, et al.,
Docket No. C-40-58, was filed April 14, 1958, involving
lands within the Navajo Indian Reservation which had
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been leased by the Tribe to the Superior Oil Company.
Western States likewise had a purported lease from the
State on these lands. In the federal court cases, the State
of Utah, the members of its Land Board, Western States
and other purported owners of interests under the purported state leases, Honolulu Oil Corporation and Superior Oil Company are all parties.
When the injunction was dismissed, defendants in
the federal court cases had sought to have proceedings
stayed pending the filing of a proposed declaratory judgment action in the state courts. This was denied. The
present case was then filed on April 21, 1958. The motion
to stay federal court proceedings was renewed and a
hearing was had on July 31, 1958. Government counsel
there stated that the nearest oil activity to the Hatch
property was 20 miles away and that so far as he knew
there was no mineral value to the Hatch land (p. 15,
Transcript of Hearing, July 31, 1958). He further stated
that Hatch is a brother of nL ·v. Hatch. a member of the
State Land Board of the State of l1tal1 and a defendant
inC 21-58 (id., p. 15). These statements were not controverted at the hearing. Defendants' counsel adnritted that
federal questions were involved ( id., p. 19). The court's
reasons for refusing the stay were stated after the arguments as follows (id., pp. 22-2-1) :
Now, without deciding the question at this
point, ordinarily one would expect that, if the
State of Utah wanted to exchange a school section
for some other section in the public dmnain, when
that exchange was 1nade that they are going to
give just as 1nany rights, including n1ineral, in
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that section, to the United States as they expected
to get back in the section they received from the
United States. That is what one ordinarily would
expect, whether it was the United States and the
State dealing or whether it was you and I dealing. If I had a school section and wanted to trade
it to you for a section that wasn't a school section
and nothing was said about mineral rights-nobody thought about it then because there wasn't
any oil down there discovered in them-one would
expect that when that was exchanged you would
get all the rights in the school section and I would
get all the rights in the other section.
Now, you are calling my attention to circumstances which you say alter this case, and one of
them is that state statute. But there are a lot
of others.
Here you have two parties to an exchange,
and we are going to have a look into all of the
circumstances involved, it seems to me. One of
the important things is that the exchange was
made with the United States of America. And
that Garfield case1 is not really the kind of case
you are concerned with. You are concerned with
the cases down there in San Juan County and perhaps other counties where there are valuable oil
discoveries and those school sections now are very
valuable things.
I should think, Mr. McCarthy, that if the State
is going to decide this case for you it ought to
decide all of these issues; if this ,Court is going to
decide this case for you, this Court should decide
all these issues, because they are irretrievably
intermingled and tied together-you can't separate them. You are trying to try this case piece1

This refers to the Hatch case which was filed in Garfield Gounty.
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meal; you are trying to get the Supreme Court of
Utah to decide one little segment of it. It may be
decisive ; it may not be, I don't know. I don't know
enough about it yet. And after that you are perfectly happy to come back and let us monkey
around with the rest of it. You are trying that
case piecemeal. You have one question: Under all
of the circumstances, including the statutes on
both sides and everything else, did they reserve
those mineral rights or didn't they~
For some reason you folks think you would
rather get that matter decided over in the state
courts, and you are entitled to do it if you can.
The United States for some reason - and one
reason the United States is here is perfectly evident: There are federal questions involved. This
is the only court where they can have those questions decided and this is the proper forum for the
United States to appear as a party either to sue
or be sued. That is why they are here. I do not
think the United States is here with any idea that
this Court's decision is going to be any more or
less favorable to them.
I don't know why I should pay any attention
to that sort of consideration anyway.
MR. McCARTHY: I agree with your Honor.
THE COURT: Any at all. It seems to me
that you have a case here, and we have spent a lot
of time thinking about it, we have spent a lot of
tim~ thinking and talking about this. Now, it
seems to me this is the proper forum to try this
issue. I don't think it is as narrow an issue as
you urge.
The motion to stay was denied and there is now pend·
ing in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
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Circuit an application for leave to file a petition for
a writ of certiorari to reverse this ruling.
III.
THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES

The United States believes that the State of Utah
has waived and relinquished all right, title and interest
to the former school sections for which it has received
lieu lands. The federal statutes provide that selection
of the lieu lands "shall be a waiver of its [the State's]
right to said sections" [school sections]. R.S. 2275, as reenacted by the Act of February 28, 1891, 26 Stat. 796,
43 U.S.C. sec. 851. The relevant portions of various
federal statutes are printed in the Appendix, infra. The
Act of May 3, 1902, 32 Stat. 189, 43 U.S.C. sec. 853,
i'nfra, p. iii, specifically made these provisions for lieu
selections applicable to Utah. These statutes contemplated the exchange of full fee title on an acreage basis
as stated in section 852, infra, p. ii. No reservation of
minerals was authorized. The selection lists filed by the
State to take advantage of these opportunities did not
purport to reserve any minerals. Clearly any attempt
to do so would have been rejected by federal authorities
as not authorized by law. In contrast, the ·Taylor Grazing
Act, 48 Stat. 1269, as amended 43 U.S.C. sec. 315g, authorized reservation of minerals in exchanges when
lands mineral in character are involved.
Many exchanges, both before and after 1919, were
made without expression of a mineral reservation. The
State seizes upon the 1919 statutes to argue that the
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Land Board had no jurisdiction to waive the State's interest in the minerals in the former school sections. We
think the trial court correctly held that such limitation
did not apply to school land exchanges. The administrative actions of both state and federal officials confirm
that view.
Even if a contrary construction of the 1919 statute
viewed in vacuo should be taken, we believe that there
are other reasons why the State's claim to these minerals
must be rejected. But, as we point out later in detail in
Point VI, these matters cannot be decided on the record
of the present case. They relate in part to federal questions which are here presented and likewise, we believe,
have a bearing on the proper construction of the Utah
statute and to the question whether on all the facts the
statute should be construed so as to nullify many outstanding titles.
IV.
THIS CASE IS NOT CONTROLLED BY UTAH LAW

At the first hearing in federal court regarding the
injunction the following colloquy took place between the
court and Mr. MeCarthy. ·rrho is one of the counsel for
plaintiff here (Transcript of Henrin!Y, ~farch 15.1958. pp.
41-42):
MR. McCARTHY: I respectfully suggest
there are potential and probable constitutional
issues.
THE COlTRT: "\Yhat are the constitutional
issues 1
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MR. McCARTHY: For example, under the
Federal statute under which this exchange was
made is the provision that exchange of these lands
constitutes a waiver by the state of its rights.
Query: Should the question of whether or not a
waiver has taken place here be determined on
the basis of state law or should it be determined
on the basis of a Federal statute~
THE COURT: What is the constitutional
question~

MR. McCARTHY: If determined on the basis
of a Federal statute, I think there is a serious
question involved as to the right of the Federal
Government to legislate in a field with respect
to states rights in these minerals and whether or
not a certain action constitutes a waiver of the
states rights with respect to the minerals.
I think, just as much as there are questions
in this case of an impairment of the contract, there
is such a problem involved in this case, the implied
contract of exchange by which the state offers
these lands and the Government accepts the lands
and conveys lieu lands to the state. Also, I have
no doubt that if the state statutes were construed
as the State of Utah and Western States Refining
Company would want them construed, that thA
Federal Government would be claiming a violation
of due process, the taking of property without
due process. I think there are potential constitutional questions, very much so, in this case, your
Honor.
See also supra, p. 7, 8.
While it is not admitted that the constitutional questions referred to by counsel in the above quoted colloquy
exist, yet the federal court and all parties before it are
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agreed that there are federal questions involved. Some
of them relate to the correct construction of the federal
statutes. And, of course, the issue whether State law controls is itself a federal question. Plaintiff argues that the
issue here is the lack of authority of its agents to convey
minerals to the United States and that this question is
controlled by local law. But this is a two-party transaction between the State and the United States. Dyer v.
Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951), rejected a similar attempt by
West Virginia to make its law as to authority of its officers control performapce of an interstate compact. The
court said ( p. 28) :
But a compact is after all a legal document.
Though the circumstances of its drafting are likely
to assure great care and deliberation, all avoidance
of disputes as to scope and meaning is not within
human gift. Just as this Court has power to settle
disputes between States where there is no compact,
it must have final power to pass upon the meaning
and validity of compacts. It requires no elaborate
argument to reject the suggestion that an agreement solemnly entered into between States by
those who alone have political authority to speak
for a. State can be unilaterally nullified, or given
final meaning by an organ of one of the contracting States. A State cannot be its own ultimate
judge in a contro\ersy with a sister State. To
determine the nature and scope of obligations as
between States, whether they arise through the
legislative n1eans of con1pact or the "federal
common law" gov-erning interstate controversies
(Hinderlider v. LaPlata Go .. 30± U.S. 92, 110), is
the function and duty of the Supreme Court of
the Nation. Of course every deference will be
shown to what the highest court of a State deems
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to be the law and policy of its State, particularly
when recondite or unique features of local law are
urged. Deference is one thing; submission to a
State's own determination of whether it has
undertaken an obligation, what that obligation is,
and whether it conflcts with a disability of the
State to undertake it is quite another.
In Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275
(1958), the respondents argued that contracts between
California irrigation districts and the United States had
been invalidated under State law controlling the authority of local districts to contract. The United States Supreme Court held that the decision of the State Supreme
Court, in fact, was based on mistaken views of federal
law and left open the question whether State law could
control, saying (p. 290) :
Nor would the suggestion that state law prevented the water districts and agencies of the
State from entering into the contracts change
this conclusion. We need not determine whether
a State could in that manner frustrate the consummation of a federal project constructed at its own
behest. The fact remains that the state law was,
in fact, invoked only by the interpretation the
court gave §8 [of the Federal Reclamation Laws].
This argument that local law controlled authority of a
local entity was also urged in City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 357 U.S. 320 (1958), but not decided because the
case went off on other grounds.
Moreover, the exchange transaction whereby the
State of Utah received other lands in lieu of school sections was contractual in nature. The construction and
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effect of federal contracts is governed by federal law.
United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 183
(1944); Cle1arjield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S.
363, 366-367 (1943); Kem-Limerick Inc. v. Scurlock, 347
U.S. 110, 121-122 (1954); United States v. Latrobe Construction Company, 246 F. 2d 357 (C.A. 8, 1957), cert.
den. 355 U.S. 890; United States v. Independent School
Dist. No. 1, 209 F. 2d 578, 580-581 (1954); American
Homes v. Schneider, 211 F. 2d 881, 882-883 (C.A. 3,
1954).2 United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315 (1876), relied
on by appellant, is irrelevant since it rested on the authority of local government to control testamentary dispositions. Cf. United States v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87
(1950). Cases such as United States v. Nebo Oil Co., 190
F.2d 1003 (C.A. 5, 1951), and Los Angeles and Salt Lake
R. Co. v. United States, 140 F. 2d 435 (C.A. 9, 1944),
simply applied local law of real property in construing
deeds from private parties to the United States. The
present situation where transactions of a contractual nature with the State itself are concerned clearly brings into
play different principles. And it should be noted that the
more recent Supreme Court decision in Leiter Minerals
v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957), recognized that
federal law might control even the title acquired from
private interests. \Ve find nothing in California v.
Deseret Water Co .. :2±3 U.S. ±15 (1917), holding that the
2 These

dedsions make plain the irrelevancy of Erie R. Co. V.

Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). It was under the mistaken notion

that the Erie case applied here that the district court said he
would be obliged to follow lthe State court decisions (Transcript
of Hearing, July 31, 1958, p. 12).
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issue presented turned on federal law which supports the
claim that state law controls here. Newton v. State Bo,ard
of Land Com'rs, 37 Idaho 58, 219 Pac. 1053 (1923), cited
by the State (Br.17-21), was a writ of prohibition against
the State Board of Land Commissioners before they had
purported to make any exchanges. The series of transactions between the United States and Utah over the last
39 years cannot be ignored. The Newton case, if anything,
tends to confirm our position since it shows that within
a few years of passage of the 1919 Utah Act a somewhat
similar question as to authority with regard to school
lands was raised in an adjoining state. The fact that
nevertheless the pre-1919 practice as to exchanging
school lands continued in Utah demonstrates the understanding of the participants that the 1919 statute had not
changed things.
We want to make it clear that this brief outline of
some of the federal questions that may be presented before this controversy is resolved is by no means intended
to be complete or exhaustive. Other issues may well
emerge when all of the facts surrounding this series of
federal-state transactions have been brought to light.

v.
THE STATE IS NOT ENTITLED TO BOTH THE
MINERALS IN THE SCHOOL LANDS AND THE
FULL FEE TITLE TO THE EXCHANGED LANDS.

The State admits that under federal law there was
contemplated an exchange of equivalents. It asserts, however that, since lands selected were to be non-mineral
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in character, there was an exchange of equivalents. The
federal court gave the obvious answer (supra, p. 7)
when it said that all rights in each section would be exchanged since minerals were not known to exist in either
section. 3 The non-mineral character of the lieu lands
is determined at the time the State selects them and the
United States thereby parts with all interests, including
minerals, later discovered. Wyoming v. United States,
255 U.S. 489 (1921). The same result applies as to the
school sections, we submit, since when the State makes
its selection "Equity then regards the State as the owner
of the selected tract and the United States as owning
the other; and this equitable ownership carries with it
whatever of advantage or disadvantage may arise from
a subsequent change in conditions whether one tract or
the other be affected." Wyoming v. United States, 255
U.S. 489, 497 (1921). Federal law thus prohibits the
State from retaining any interest in the school section
and also securing the lieu section.
VI.

THE RECORD OF THIS CASE DOES NOT PRESENT
ADEQUATE BASIS UPON WHICH TO DECIDE IMPORTANT FEDERAL AND STATE QUESTIONS.

The answer to the federal questions suggested above
depends to considerable degree on facts not in this record.
It is extremely important that the conduct, expressions of
opinion, etr., of both federal and state officers or agensThe Utah school land grant excluded lands known to be mineral.
United States v. Sweet, 245 U.S. 562 (1918).
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cies participating in the exchanges be known. Illustrative
of the importance of the administrative practice is United
States v. Wyoming, 331 U.S. 440 (1947), which also shows
the relevancy of practices in regard to other states. In
United St,ates v. Burlington, Etc., R.R .Co., 98 U.S. 334
(1878), the court, speaking of an amendment to a railroad
land grant, said (p. 341):
Such has been the uniform construction given to
the acts by all departments of the government.
Patents have been issued, bonds given, mortgages
executed, and legislation had upon this construction. This uniform action is as potential, and as
conclusive of the soundness of the construction, as
if it had been declared by judicial decision. It
cannot at this day be called in question.
See also Minnesota Company v. National Company, 3
Wall. 332, 334 (1865). So here the actions of the State,
the grantees of the lieu lands, and the subsequent interests in the chains of title resting on those grants, as well
as actions of the United States as to school lands, may
reveal that a situation exists which should not be overturned regardless of the correct a priori construction of
the statute. See also Gate v. Beasley, 299 U.S. 30 (1936).
Also, it is quite possible that rules of estoppel, laches and
the like may be applicable to this federal-state controversy.
We submit that before a multitude of titles is disturbed, as may result from the State's argument, these
facts should be thoroughly examined. We doubt if defendant Hatch would be willing to undertake the expense
of the necessary research and presentation of evidence
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concerning those matters, since no valuable oil and gas
deposits appear to be contained in his land. We suggest,
however, that in the federal court cases the resources
of the United States and the oil companies having a
direct and important interest in the outcome are available
and will be used to discover and produce all relevant
material. This case could properly, we believe, be held
in abeyance pending such proceedings.
There is precedent for refusal to decide important
questions on an inadequate record. In Kennedy v. Silas
Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249 (1948), important issues under
the Fair Labor Standards Act were presented. The case
was disposed of on motion for summary judgment. The
Supreme Court vacated the judgment which the court
of appeals had affirmed. It said (pp. 256-257) :
The short of the matter is that we have an extremely important question, probably affecting all
cost-plus-fixed-fee war contractors and many of
their employees inunediately, and ultimately affecting by a vast sum the cost of fighting the war.
No conclusion in such a case should prudently be
rested on an indefinite factual foundation. The
case, which eounsel have described as a constantly
expanding one, c01nes to us aln1ost in the status
in which it should come to a trial court. In addition to the welter of new contentions and statutory
provisions we n1ust pick our way an1ong over a
score of teehnieal contracts. each a1nending some
earlier one, w-ithout full baekground knowledge
of the dealings of the parties. The hearing of
contentions as to disputed facts. the sorting of
documents to select relevant provisions, ascertain
their ultimatP fonn and meaning in the case. the
practieal construction put on them by the parties
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and reduction of the mass of conflicting contentions as to fact and inference frorn facts, is a
task primarily for a court of one judge, not for a
court of nine.
We do not hold that in the form the controversy took in the District Court that tribunal
lacked power or justification for applying the
summary judgment procedure. But summary procedures, however salutary where issues are clearcut and simple/ present a treacherous record for
deciding issues of far-flung import, on which this
Court should draw inferences with caution from
complicated courses of legislation, contracting and
practice.
We consider it the part of good judicial administration to withhold decision of the ultimate
questions involved in this case until this or another record shall present a more solid basis of
findings based on litigation or on a comprehensive
statement of agreed facts. While we might be
able, on the present record, to reach a conclusion
that would decide the case, it might well be found
later to be lacking in the thoroughness that should
precede judgment of this importance and which it
is the purpose of the judicial process to provide.
56 requires that ~summary judgment ,shall be rendered if
"there is no genuine issue as Ito any material fact . . .'' See
note 4.

7Rule

See also Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Co., 339 U.S. 667, 677678 (1950).
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CONCLUSION
It is submitted that either the judgment should be
affirmed or, if vacated, the case should be remanded and
held in abeyance pending full development of all relevant
facts in the federal court proceedings.
Respectfully,
PERRY W. MORTON,
Assistant Attorney General
A. PRATT KESLER,
United States Attorney,
Salt Lake City, Utah
C. NELSON DAY,
Assistant United States Attorney
Salt Lake City, Utah
ROGER P. MARQUIS,
Attorney, Department of Justicf!,
Washington 25, D.C.

SEPTEMBER, 1958
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APPENDIX
R.S. 2275, as re-enacted by the Act of February
28, 1891, 26 Stat. 796, 43 U.S:C. sec. 851, provides :
Deficiencies in grants to State by reason of
settlements, etc., on designated sections generally.
Where settlements with a view to preemption or
homestead have been, prior to February 26, 1859,
or shall thereafter be made, before the survey of
the lands in the field, which are found to have been
made on sections 16 or 36, those sections shall be
subject to the claims of such settlers; and if such
sections, or either of them, have been or shall
be granted, reserved, or pledged for the use of
schools or colleges in the State or Territory in
which they lie, other lands of equal acreage are
hereby appropriated and granted, and may be
selected by said State or Territory, in lieu of such
as may be thus taken by preemption or homestead
settlers. And other lands of equal acreage are
also hereby appropriated and granted, and may
be selected by said State or Territory where sections 16 or 36 are mineral land, or are included
within any Indian, military, or other reservation,
or are otherwise disposed of by the United States:
Provided, Where any State is entitled to said
sections 16 and 36, or where said sections are reserved to any Territory, notwithstanding the same
may be mineral land or embraced within a military, Indian, or other reservation, the selection
of such lands in lieu thereof by said State or
Territory shall be a waiver of its right to said
sections. And other lands of equal acreage are
also hereby appropriated and granted, and may
be selected by said State or Territory to compensate deficiencies for school purposes, where sections 16 or 36 are fractional in quantity, or where
one or both are wanting by reason of the town-
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ship being fractional,, or from any natural cause
whatever. And it shall be the duty of the Secre~
tary of the Interior, without awaiting the exten~
sion of the public surveys, to ascertain and determine, by protraction or otherwise, the number o.f
townships that will be included within such Indian
military or other reservations, and thereupon th~
State or Territory shall be entitled to select in~
demnity lands to the extent of two sections for
each of said townships, in lieu of sections 16 and
36 therein; but such selections may- not be made
within the boundaries of said reservations: Pro~
vided, however, that nothing in this section contained shall prevent any State or Territory from
awaiting the extinguishment of any such military, Indian, or other reservation and the restoration of the lands therein embraced to the public
domain and then taking the sections 16 and 36 in
place therein; but nothing in this proviso shall be
construed as conferring any right not in this section existing prior to February 28, 1891.
43 U.S.C. sec. 852 provides:
Selections to supply def~·ciencies of school
lands. The lands appropriated by the preceding
section shall be selected fr01n any unappropriated,
surveyed public lands, not 1nineral in character,
within the State or Territory where such losses
or deficiencies of school secti~ns occur; and where
the selections are to compensate for deficiencies
of school lands in fractional townships, such selections shall be made in accordance with the following principles of adjushnent, to wit: For each
township, or fractional township, containing a
greater quantit~r of land than three-quarters of
an entire township, one section; for a fractional
township, containing a greater quantity of land
than one-half, and not more than three-quarters
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of a township, three quarters of a section; for
a fractional township, containing a greater quantity of land than one quarter, and not more than
one half of a township, one-half section; and for
a fractional township containing a greater quantity of land than one entire section, and not more
than one-quarter of a township, one quarter section of land: Provided, That the States or Territories which are, or shall be entitled to both the
sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections in place, shall
have the right to select double the amounts named,
to compensate for deficiencies of school land in
fractional townships.
The Act of May 3, 1902, 32 Stat. 189, 43 U.S.C. sec.
853, provides :
Selections in Utah to supply defi'cencies of
school lands. All the provisions of sections 851
and 852 of this title, which provide for the selection of lands for educational purposes in lieu of
those appropriated for other purposes, are made
applicable to the State of Utah, and the grant of
school lands to said State, including sections 2
and 32 in each township, and indemnity therefor,
shall be administered and adjusted in accordance
with the provisions of said sections, anything in
the Act providing for the admission of said State
into the Union, to the contrary notwithstanding.
Wherever the words "sections 16 and 36"
occur in said sections, the same as applicable to
the State of Utah shall read: "sections 2, 16, 32,
and 36," and wherever the words "sixteenth and
thirty-sixth sections" occur the same shall read :
"second, sixteenth, thirty-second, and thirty-sixth
sections," and wherever the words "sections 16 or
36" occur the same shall read: "sections 2, 16, 32,
or 36," and wherever the words "two sections"
occur the same shall read "four sections."
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